We present an efficient proposal on using both the triggered and non-triggered events of heralded single-photon sources for the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known that the quantum key distribution (QKD) is standing out compared with conventional cryptography due to its unconditional security based on the law of physics.
It allows two legitimate users, say Alice and Bob, to share secret keys even under the present of a malicious eavesdropper, Eve. But its security proofs often contain certain assumptions either on the sources or on the detection systems, and usually practical setups have imperfections. Therefore, the "in-principle" unconditional security can actually conflict with realistic implementations, and which might be exploited by Eve to hack the system [1] [2] [3] [4] .
In order to solve the conflictions between the theory and the practice, different approaches have been proposed, such as the decoy-state method [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , the device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) [10, 11] and recently the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [12, 13] . Among them, the MDI-QKD seems to be a very promising candidate considering its relatively lower technical demanding.
People [12, 13] have given out security proofs for the MDI-QKD and demonstrated that it can offer excellent security by removing all side-channel attacks on measurement devices. In particular, the decoy-state MDI-QKD was studied extensively with infinite different intensities [12] and a few intensities [15] . However, the efficient decoy-state MDIQKD with heralded source is not shown. We know that weak coherent states (WCSs) at least have two drawbacks: one is the large vacuum component, and the other is the significant multi-photon probabilities. The former leads to a rather limited transmission distance, since the dark count contributes lots of bit-flip errors for long distance. The latter one results in a quite low key generation rate. In the existing MDI-QKD [12, 13] setup, all detections are done in Z basis. There are events of two incident photons presenting on the same side of the beam-splitter and no incident photon on another side. Such a case can cause a quite high observed error rate in X basis. Though in principle one can deduce the phase-flip error rate by comparison of the observed error rate in X basis for different groups of pulses as shown in [15] , the high error rate in X basis can still decrease the key rate drastically in the real implementation when we take the statistical fluctuation into consideration. Fortunately, besides the WCSs, there is another practically easy implementable source, the heralded single-photon source (HSPS). The source can eliminate those drawbacks, and give much better performance than WCSs in the QKD [16, 17] , since the dark count can be eliminated to a negligible level for a triggered source. The cause of high error rate in X basis does not exist for a HSPS because the probability for events of two incidents photons on the same side of the beam-splitter is a high order small value.
We also note that it is impossible to use infinite number of decoy states in a realistic MDI-QKD, therefore, people often use one or two decoy states to estimate the behavior of the vacuum, the single-photon and the multi-photon states [8, 16] .
Here in this work, we study MDI-QKD with heralded single-photon sources. We use both the triggered and non-triggered events of HSPSs to precisely estimate the lower bound of the two-single-photon contribution (Y 11 ) and the upper bound of the quantum bit-error rate (QBER) of two-single-photon pulses (e 11 ). As a result, we get an much longer transmission distance and a much higher key generation rate compared with existing decoy-state MDI-QKD methods [15] , and come close to the result of infinite different intensities. After presenting the schematic set-up of the method, we shall present formulas such as Y 11 and e 11 for calculating the key rate in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we proceed numerical simulations with practical parameters and compare with existing schemes. Finally, we give conclusions in Sec IV.
II. IMPROVED METHOD OF DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD WITH HERALDED SOURCE

A. The method and formulas
We know that the state of a two-mode field from the parametric-down conversion (PDC) source is [18, 19] : where |n represents an n-photon state, and x is the intensity (average photon number) of one mode. Mode T (trigger) is detected by Alice or Bob, and mode S (signal) is sent out to the UTP. ∆t c is the coherence time of the emission, and ∆t is the duration of the pump pulse. As demonstrated in [20, 21] , we can either get a thermal distribution or a poisson distribution by adjusting the experimental conditions, e.g. changing the duration of the pump pulses. Below, we will at first use HSPSs with poisson distributions as an example to describe our new MDI-QKD scheme, and then compare it with the case of with thermal distributions.
We denote q υ n as the probability of triggering at Alice or Bob's detector when n-photon state is emitted,
for i 1. Here υ can be A (Alice) or B (Bob), η υ and d υ are the detection efficiency and the dark count rate at Alice (Bob)'s side, respectively. Then the corresponding non-triggering probability is (1 − q υ n ). We request Alice (or Bob) to randomly change the intensity of her (or his) pump light among three values, so that the intensity of one mode is randomly changed among 0, µ, and µ ′ (and µ < µ ′ ). We define the subclass of source pulses that Alice uses intensity x, Bob uses intensity y as source {x, y}, each x and y can be any values from {0, µ, µ ′ }. As
shown latter, we shall use the gain of triggered events from the source of intensity µ and the gain of non-triggered events from source of intensity µ ′ to calculate the yield for states of a single photon from each side, Y 11 . Numerical results show that the key rate of the method is very close to the ideal case where we use infinite intensities, and the method is more efficient than a method that obtains Y 11 by using the gains of triggered events from both sources of intensity µ and µ ′ . As in [12, 15] , we use the rectilinear basis (Z) as the key generation basis, and the diagonal basis (X) for error testing only. We denote Y Here we assume to implement the decoy-state method in different bases separately, therefore we shall omit the supperscript W here after provided that this does not make any confusion.
The un-normalized density matrice for the two-pulse state of a triggered event is
with p A n = q A n P n (x) and p B n = q B n P n (y) . According to the definitions above, we have
HereS
According to the definition of gains above, one easily finds that fact
. All these gains are known values. ThereforeS
is a known value. Similarly, for the non-triggered events, we have 
3 e 2µ−2µ ′ , and combining Eq. (3) and (2), we obtain
and
To lower bound Y 11 here, we can choose to set the following simultaneous conditions:
When both conditions above are met, we have the following inequality for the lower band of Y 11 :
(since the value of µ and µ ′ can be chosen separately, the above conditions can be easily satisfied in practice,) In particular, in the symmetric case that η A = η B = η, the conditions on Eq.(6) reduce to
for all m ≥ 3. For simplicity, we shall use such a condition for all calculations. Then the gain of the two-single-photon pulses for the triggered and non-triggered signals (µ ′ ) are:
As mentioned above, we use two bases in this protocol, i.e., the Z basis and the X basis.
We use the former to generate real keys, and the latter only for error test. After error test, we get the bit-flip error rates for the triggered and non-triggered pulses as E t µ,µ and E nt µ ′ ,µ ′ . In order to calculate the final key rate, we also need to know the phase-flip error rate of two-single-photon pulses in the Z basis, i.e. e ph,t 11 (or e ph,nt 11 ) which is equal to the bit-flip rate in the X basis, e X,t 11 (or e X,nt 11 ), whose values can be represented as:
or e X,nt 11
Combing the two bounds, we have:
Now we can calculate the final key generation rate for the triggered signal pulses (µ ′ ) as:
where the factor of 1 2
comes from the cost of the basis mismatch in Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol; f (E µ ′ ) is a factor for the cost of error correction given existing error correction systems in practice, and we assume f = 1.16 here [12] . H 2 (x) is the binary Shannon information function, given by
In fact, the non-triggered events can also be used to derived secret keys as shown in [22] . However, for simplicity, in the following simulations we consider only the triggered components.
B. Some remarks on Eqs. (4) and (6) General formulas for s 11 and the conditions were presented in in Ref. [15] . Where it assumes that Alice (Bob) has three sources, denoted as 0, µ A , µ
. Denote ρ x (ρ y ) as the density operator for source x (y) at Alice's (Bob's) side, and x (y) can take any value from 0, µ A , µ
and it shows that
and s L 11 is given by the right hand side of Eq. (16) in Ref. [15] , K a , ζ 1 , ζ 2 , ξ are all defined there [15] . To make sure s 11 ≥ s L 11 , we need the fraction
In order that the result is physically meaningful, we also need s L 11 > 0 Ref. [15] requests both the numerator and the denominator to be non-negative. This indeed gives meaningful physical result (s L 11 > 0) for many sources, such as the coherent light and the triggered state of the PDC light. Mathematically, the whole fraction can also be non-negative if we choose both the numerator and the denominator to be non-positive. Given such a mathematical choice, normal sources like coherent states, triggered state of the PDC light does not give a positive value for s L 11 . However, here in our case, we use triggered results for µ and non-triggered results for µ ′ . We find that s L 11 is indeed positive and the key rate can be optimized under such a mathematical setting.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
With formulas above, we can now numerically calculate the key rate and compare the secret key generation rate of our new MDI-QKD scheme with existing methods [12, 15] .
Moreover, we will show the different results of our proposed scheme using different HSPSs, i.e., in poissonian or thermal distributions. Below for simplicity, we assume that the UTP locates in the middle of Alice and Bob, and the UTP's detectors are identical, i.e., they have the same dark count rate and detection efficiency, and their detection efficiency does not depend on the incoming signals.
We shall estimate what values would be probably observed for the gains and error rates in the nomal cases by the linear model as in [8, 9] :
is the combined overall transmittance and detection efficiency between Alice (or Bob) and the UTP; L is the corresponding transmit distance; η C and d C are the transmission rate and dark count rate at the UTP's side, respectively; e n is the QBER of an n-photon state; and α is the channel loss rate. Using this model, we can set values (probably would-be observed values in experiments) for S t xy , S nt xy , E t xy and E nt xy according to transmission distance. After setting these values, we can find the distance dependent key rate by Eq. (14) .
, and e m,n =
. For a fair comparison, we use the same parameters as in [12, 23] , see Table I, decoy-state case (W1), we use the parameters shown in Table I and assume a reasonable value for µ (0.2); While for our new scheme (H1), we use the same parameters as in Table   I except that η A = η B = 0.9, and borrowing the relationship of µ and µ ′ from Eq. (8). Fig.   2 (b) shows corresponding optimal values of µ ′ for each line in Fig. 2(a) . Besides, The WCSs and the HSPSs used here are all in poisson distributions. decoy-state method [15] with HSPSs. Fig. 3(a) shows the the final key generation rate vs transmit distance, and Fig. 3(b) corresponds to the optimal values of µ ′ . The lines H0 and H1 each corresponds to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy states and our new scheme, respectively. H2 represents the result of using normal three decoy-state method. Here the HSPSs used are all in poisson distributions. using infinite decoy-state method and our new scheme, respectively, and both using HSPSs in poisson distributions. While the lines T0 and T1 correspond to the results of with thermal distributions.
From the comparison above we find that:
(i). Our new scheme of using triggered and non-triggered signals can work excellently close to the asymptotic case with infinite decoy-state method as in Fig 2(a) and (b). On one hand, it is due to the precise estimation of the tight bounds of Y 11 and e 11 by using both triggered and non-triggered signals as shown in Eq. (7) and (11) (12) (13) ; On the other hand, because we find optimal values for both µ and µ ′ at each distance by referring the relationship of µ and µ ′ from Eq. (8).
(ii). Our new MDI-QKD scheme with HSPSs can transmit a much longer distance compared with the one with WCSs (> 30km here) as shown in Fig. 2(a) , which benefits from the substantial low vacuum components in the heralded signals.
(iii). In our new scheme, the HSPSs in poisson distributions show similar key generation rates as WCSs at short distances (< 200 km) and much higher key rates at long distances (> 200 km) as shown in Fig. 2(a) , this is attributed to a much higher optimal value of µ ′ being used as shown in Fig. 2(b) .
Moreover, our new scheme shows much better performance than normal decoy-state methods even when using the same HSPSs as shown in Fig. 3(a) , because of a much higher optimal value of µ ′ being used as shown in Fig. 3(b) .
In addition, when both applying our new scheme with HSPSs, the one in poisson distribution has better performance than the one in thermal distribution as shown in Fig. 4 (a) and (b), that is benefit from a relatively higher single-photon probability in poisson distribution.
It clearly demonstrates the necessity of exploiting poissonian distributed HSPS sources in QKD.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have studied the decoy-state MDI-QKD with heralded single photon source by using the triggered events of intensity µ and non-triggered events of the intensity µ ′ . We show that this proposed implementation offers both a higher key generation rate and a longer transmission distance compared with existing realization methods. Therefore, it looks promising for practical applications in the near future. 
